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Abstract: We investigate the possible interaction effects that the extent of property 
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2010 we find that the growth effects of property rights increase when political power is 
divided among more veto players. When distinguishing between institutional veto 
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countries with large stocks of democratic capital. 
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“Where an excess of power prevails, property 
of no sort is duly respected. No man is safe in 
his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his 
possessions. […]  Government is instituted to 
protect property of every sort; as well that 
which lies in the various rights of individuals, 
as that which the term particularly expresses. 
This being the end of government, that alone 
is a just government, which impartially secures 
to every man, whatever is his own. […] That is 
not a just government, nor is property secure 
under it, where the property which a man has 
in his personal safety and personal liberty, is 
violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of 
citizens for the service of the rest.” 
 





Recent decades have witnessed an explosion in the interest in the 
factors potentially determining economic growth (cf. Barro 1997; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).  This is not least the case for studies 
of the potential growth-inducing effects of political institutions.1 
However, while the protection of property rights often is found to 
be important for economic growth, many other results from the 
empirical research on the institutional determinants of economic 
growth seem either ambivalent or contradictory.  Most notably, 
researchers have so far failed to reach anything remotely resembling 
consensus on the effects of democracy on economic growth, with 
studies finding both positive and negative relationships, non-linear 
relationships and no effects at all, or, for that matter, that causality 
goes in the opposite direction.2  Something similar may be said 
about the potential growth effects of the extent of the dispersion of 
political power among political actors, where the possible effects are 
tested against both theories and the empirical results show both 
positive and negative consequences. 
However, very few studies have considered the possible 
combined economic growth effects of (a) the extent of property 
rights protection and (b) the extent to which political power is 
shared among “veto players”, i.e., political actors who may be able 
to block changes to the status quo.  The purpose of the present study 
is to consider the possible interaction effects of the two: Are any 
effects (positive or negative) of one or the other in reality less 
important in themselves than how they may condition each other? 
We consider this question by, first, presenting the standard 
arguments for why property rights are important for economic 
growth, and the divergent views on the effects separation of powers 
                                           
1 See, e.g., North and Thomas (1973); Weaver and Rockman (1993b); Kasper and 
Streit (1998); Borner and Paldam (1998); Scully (2001); Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001); Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004); and Haan (2007). 
2 Compare, e.g., Helliwell (1994); Barro (1996, 1997); Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu (2008); and Gundlach and Paldam (2009). 
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(section 2).  But, what is more important, we suggest—in line with 
the arguments of Melton (2013) and Justesen (2014)—that property 
rights matter for economic growth mainly in institutional contexts 
wherein political power is divided among a number of political 
actors.  Such arrangements work as formal mechanisms that affect 
the ability of governments to change existing property rights at 
some point in the future and, while a system of checks-and-balances 
need not directly affect the “strength” or “quality” of property 
rights, it does affect their credibility.  For this reason, we expect that 
strong property rights in isolation are insufficient to generate 
economic growth.  Rather the growth effects of property rights tend 
to become stronger as their credibility increases, i.e., when political 
power is divided among several political actors. 
We then outline the empirical strategy to be followed and identify 
the relevant data (section 3.1). The statistical analyses with regard to 
institutional interactions (section 3.2) and democratic capital (section 
3.3) are presented next.  Relative to prior work (Justesen 2014; cf. 
Justesen and Kurrild-Klitgaard 2007), this paper makes the 
following contributions to the literature.  First, we examine the 
interactions of property rights and veto players for a large number 
of countries over a longer time horizon (40 years).  Second, rather 
than relying only on broad indices of power sharing, we decompose 
the veto player index developed by Witold Henisz in order to 
separate measures of purely institutional veto players from partisan 
veto players, generated by the outcomes of elections (Henisz 2000, 
2002, cf. Henisz [2002] 2010).  Third, we compare the interaction 
effect for countries that have experienced political regime changes in 
their recent history versus countries with stable political regimes.  
The final section summarizes and concludes (section 4). 
 
2. Property rights, veto players and economic growth 
 
Institutional economists and public choice theorists have in recent 
decades drawn attention not only to the fact that economic systems 
across the modern world are embedded in political systems, but also 
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to how the economic behavior of market actors may be influenced 
by the nature of the political institutions governing them (North 
1990: 48; Weingast 1995). 
Property rights are the rights of individuals to undertake actions 
with regard to their own persons, including labor supply, and the 
disposition of the goods and services they possess (North 1990: 33).  
Property rights are influenced by political institutions to the extent 
that the latter affect 1) the set of permissible actions and strategies, 
both political and private, and 2) the relative prices of choosing one 
action (political or economic) rather than another (Brennan and 
Hamlin 1995: 288).  Political institutions thus create a structure of 
incentives that will influence the economic behavior of individuals 
as well as their political choices.  When institutions impose costs and 
benefits on actions these will tend to reduce some types of behavior 
and encourage other types relatively more so; both will affect the 
coordination of economic actions and determine the extent of 
institutional limits on the powers of political decision-makers, i.e., 
the costs of making political decisions and what the content of them 
must or cannot be (Buchanan 2000).  The existence of private 
property rights and efficient enforcement both of those rights and of 
contracts will contribute to defining such an incentive structure, and 
any set of institutional arrangements will tend to affect the relative 
costs or benefits of different types of behavior (cf. Buchanan 2000).  
   
2.1 Protection of property rights 
 
The theoretical arguments for the economic importance of private 
property rights are well-established and straightforward: Effective 
protection of private property rights enables economic actors to plan 
ahead and gives them sufficient incentives to invest in capital (Smith 
[1776] 1981; Mises [1949] 1966; Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Kasper 
and Streit 1998; Pipes 1999).  It also reduces transaction costs (Coase 
1960; North 1992), both in economic transactions and in political 
decision-making (Buchanan and Tullock [1962] 2004; Bernholz 
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2012).  Economic actors will enter only into those exchanges that 
they expect to be mutually beneficial, and if property rights are well 
protected and markets are free of interference, significant room for 
reaping gains from exchange exists, and the long-term consequence 
contributes to society’s welfare.  Fundamentally, economic growth 
presupposes that the actions and interactions of individuals are 
productive, and a regime of well-defined property rights encourages 
them to engage in productive behavior and trade rather than in 
destructive, exploitative and purely redistributive behavior (Mises 
[1927] 2005; Rothbard 1956; Olson 2000).  In this manner, a system in 
which property rights are protected tends to align individual’s 
interests with society’s interests so as to enhance cooperation and 
foster economic growth.  
In contrast, without any protection of property rights, actors are 
likely to find themselves in a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like setting 
resembling a Hobbesian state-of-nature, where everyone will have 
an incentive to shift their behavior from productive to predatory 
(Tullock 1974; Buchanan [1975] 1999).  In Hobbes’s famous words: 
 
In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use 
of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious 
building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require 
much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no 
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and 
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short. (Hobbes [1651] 1991, §62: 88–89) 
 
Property rights may be said to be secure when individuals are 
entitled to use and transfer what they own free of aggression by 
others (including the government itself), and insecure when rights 
are unclear, unprotected or both.  Protection of property rights may 
come in a number of different forms and may include a cluster of 
institutions, including efficient enforcement against public and 
private predation, e.g., constitutional restrictions on expropriation 
(“takings”), parliamentary procedures and limitations regarding 
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taxation and, more generally and indirectly, an independent 
judiciary that constrain the exercise of executive authority, i.e., the 
police powers of the state (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005).  
In general, it will also presuppose, inter alia, effective enforcement 
of contracts and a system of tort and criminal law. 
All in all, economic reasoning suggests that secure property rights 
are a necessary precondition for economic growth to occur (Leblang 
1996; Asoni 2008). So far, the results of empirical research largely 
have confirmed these expectations: Most studies find a strong, 
positive correlation between secure private property and economic 
growth.3  However, studies also exist suggesting, e.g., that those 
correlations are weak or non-existent (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; 
Glaeser et al. 2004), that improvements in property rights rankings 
are not correlated with economic growth, or that the results depend 
crucially on the samples of countries studied (Martínez and King 
2010; Fails and Krieckhaus 2010). 
 
2.2 Separation of powers 
 
2.2.1. THE CREDIBILITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION 
A fundamental political dilemma for any political-economic system 
lies in the fact that a government must be strong enough to enforce 
property rights in general for social and economic interactions to be 
productive, but that the government’s strength simultaneously may 
pose a potential threat against the very rights it was supposed to 
protect (Weingast 1995: 1).  Cf. Madison’s famous reasoning in 
Federalist No. 51 in defense of separation of powers: 
 
                                           
3 See, e.g., Torstensson (1994); Goldsmith (1995); Knack and Keefer (1995); 
Clague et al. (1996); Leblang (1996); Keefer and Knack (1997); Carlsson and 
Lundström (2002); O'Driscoll and Hoskins (2003); Claessens and Laeven (2003); 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Berggren and Jordahl (2005); and Berggren, 
Bergh and Bjørnskov (2012); cf. Asoni (2008). 
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If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary 
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the 
necessity of auxiliary precautions. (Hamilton, Jay and Madison [1787] 
2001: 269). 
 
This is feature—that political decisions often are reversible and that 
a majority may undo what another has done—creates an 
asymmetry, a “time inconsistency problem”:  The government may 
at one point promise not to do something at a future time, but then 
later have an incentive not to honor this promise (cf. Blanchard and 
Fischer 1989: 592).  If an investor fears that a government has an 
incentive to expropriate property or suddenly and arbitrarily to 
increase the tax rate on profits ex post, this will create an incentive 
for postponing the investment, changing it or abstaining altogether 
from engaging in it.  The decisions of economic actors with regard to 
investment, production, trade, and so on, accordingly depend not 
only on previous or contemporary policies and institutions but also, 
and not least, on their expectations regarding the policies and 
institutions that will regulate their decisions at some later time 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977: 474).  This is, in essence, a question of 
credible commitment: The government’s ability to bind itself to a set 
of institutions and policies that will protect private property and 
generally be conducive to economic growth will be crucial when it 
comes to stimulating (or impairing) productive behavior (North and 
Weingast 1989; Weymouth 2011; Melton 2013).  
 
2.2.2. VETO PLAYERS AND THE STATUS QUO 
It is with respect to expectations that a separation of political powers 
and the existence of veto powers potentially become important. A 
veto player may in this context be defined as a political actor whose 
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consent (or at least nil obstat) is necessary in order for a change to 
take place in the political status quo, i.e., in order to change a set of 
existing policies (Tsebelis 2002: 19; cf. Tsebelis 1995).  If there is more 
than one veto player, all must agree before a change in the status 
quo is possible.  The number and configuration of veto players in a 
political system accordingly defines the extent of separation of 
powers within the system: The more actors or institutions whose 
agreement is necessary to effect change in the political status quo, 
the more veto players there may be said to be. 
The important effects of a strong (rather than weak) separation of 
powers is that by adding to the number of veto players 
institutionalizes a requirement of unanimity among the relevant 
actors, and this (a) forces the consideration of a larger set of policy 
preferences and (b) thereby increases the transaction costs of 
collective decision-making relative to situations where fewer or only 
one political actor has the discretionary power to make the ultimate 
decision.4  It therefore becomes harder to impose external costs on 
minorities and, everything else being equal, limits decisions to those 
that represent Pareto improvements—but, of course, with more than 
one possible consequence 
On the other hand, it has long been argued in constitutional 
thought that widespread separation of powers in general will lead 
to policies that are growth promoting, if nothing else because they 
will prevent bad policies from being implemented (Buchanan and 
Tullock [1962] 2004).  To wit, in a system with only one political 
actor (say, an absolutist king or a de facto unconstrained parliament) 
it takes the decision of only one player to ram through policies with 
potentially very detrimental growth effects (e.g., large-scale 
nationalizations or confiscatory taxes).  In contrast, in a political 
system such as that of the United States, policies will need to pass 
with majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
(and with sufficiently broad support in the latter to override any 
                                           
4 On the nature of political transaction costs, see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 
([1962] 2004) and Berggren and Karlson (2003). 
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“filibuster” attempts), not be met with a presidential veto and not be 
struck down by the Supreme Court, should the legislation elicit a 
lawsuit (cf. Madison [1792] 1906: 101-03; Federalist No. 10, 47 & 51, in 
Hamilton, Jay and Madison [1787] 2001; Grofman and Wittman 
1989).  In total, such a large number of veto players and hurdles 
correspond to requiring a quite high qualified political majority 
(Miller and Hammond 1989).  By giving various interests in society 
the ability to block decisions—Madisonian reasoning argues—
policies may become more stable and government more 
trustworthy, thus providing indirect support for a growth-friendly 
environment (Weingast 1993, 1995; cf. North and Weingast 1989). 
However, the other side of the coin is that many veto players may 
make it harder to implement policies that may be widely beneficial, 
but are unpopular with small minorities that may be able to block 
them.  It can similarly be argued that the separation of powers 
between multiple veto players cannot be expected to lead to a 
particularly growth-promoting set of policies, because the situation 
simply creates a “lock in” of existing policies at a status quo level—
and the status quo might not itself be hospitable to economic growth 
(Tsebelis 2002: 204). 
That side of the issue has been argued all the way from the 
Thomas Hobbes’s defense of “Leviathan” to various modern day, 
almost neo-Hobbesian political scientists who have emphasized the 
positive effects of political decision-makers unilaterally being able to 
make decisions and implement them as costless as possible (cf., e.g., 
Weaver and Rockman 1993a) and, in contrast, pointed towards the 
negative consequences of blocking minorities.  The latter 
institutionalizes a “conservative” bias that hampers political 
flexibility and perhaps leads to a suboptimal supply of public goods 
(Cox and McCubbins 2001).  In this view, the consequence of 
multiple veto players may be institutional “grid-lock” caused by 
conflicts between two or more veto players (e.g., a parliament and a 
president), in extreme cases making it impossible to take necessary 
political decisions in response to, for example, changes in 
macroeconomic conditions related to negative, exogenous chocks to 
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the economy (Cox and McCubbins 2001: 29-30; Linz 1994: 8-10).  An 
illustrative example may be the US experience since the 1970s, 
where divergent interests in Senate, House of Representatives and 
White House have made agreement on how to balance the budget 
impossible and, hence, lead to dramatic deficits and the 
accumulation of a $17 trillion public debt. 
The potential economic benefits of a political system with 
multiple veto players (greater credibility and stability) accordingly 
must be balanced against the potential costs in the form of an 
inability to make the proper decisions when they are needed.  If 
such arguments are correct, then we should not expect the existence 
of multiple veto players to have a particularly positive effect on 
economic growth.   
The divergent theoretical expectations have been matched by the 
results of empirical research into the field of veto player effects on 
economic growth, which so far have been less than unequivocal in 
their conclusions.  Several studies have found at least some 
empirical indications that the number of veto players in a political 
system may be associated with positive economic growth (Henisz 
2000, 2002; Keefer and Knack 1997), not least when one of the veto 
players is an independent judiciary (Feld and Voigt 2003).  
However, other studies have found no or even negative correlations 
between the number of veto players and economic growth (e.g., 
Kurrild-Klitgaard 2003). 
 
2.3. The joint importance of property rights and veto 
players 
 
Very few studies have attempted to look simultaneously at the 
possible economic growth effects of the two institutional factors 
studied herein—the extent of property rights protections and the 
number of veto players in the political system—and even fewer at 
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the possible combined effects of the two.5  However, it makes sense 
to argue that simple promises of property rights’ protection or an 
extensive separation of powers in themselves may not be enough to 
create the institutional framework necessary for economic growth 
(Wagner 1993; Kurrild-Klitgaard and Berggren 2004).  For a market 
economy genuinely to operate at its fullest, limits on predation 
(public and private) and a dispersion of political power both are 
needed (Friedman 1962: 2f).  Furthermore, it is plausible that the 
effect of interactions between degrees of political power separation 
(as measured by the number of veto players) and strengths of 
property rights protections will differ across countries having 
divergent political experiences. 
 
2.3.1. INTERACTION EFFECTS 
To illustrate this, let us take the most optimistic scenario: It makes 
sense to suggest that if private property rights are strongly 
protected, and if the constitutional arrangements are such that 
(owing to to separation of powers) it will be difficult to take such 
protection away, a climate will exist wherein plans for the future can 
be made confidently and, hence, economic growth is fostered  In this 
sense, the combination of strong property rights and political 
powers divided among veto players works as “assurance” for 
investors, increasing their certainty that investments will not be 
subject to arbitrary property rights violations or various forms of 
unanticipated “hard” or “soft” expropriation now or in the 
foreseeable future (Marshall and Stone 2012). Examples include the 
nineteenth and twentieth century United States, contemporary 
Switzerland and many other western societies. 
On the other hand, the most pessimistic scenario must be seen as 
being one where only poor or non-existent protections of private 
property are in place, and where political power is highly 
                                           
5 Exceptions are Melton (2013) and Justesen (2014).  See also Kurrild-Klitgaard 
(2003); Justesen and Kurrild-Klitgaard (2007). 
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concentrated, e.g., in the hands of a de facto dictator.  Under such a 
scenario economic actors will be at the whim of the decision-makers: 
They may have possessions, but these can easily be taken away.  
Illustrative examples are often found in weakly institutionalized and 
economically less developed countries and might include, e.g., 
Tsarist Russia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the American colonies in the 17th 
and 18th centuries and much of the Middle East since the end of the 
First World War. 
In between these extremes are two other scenarios.  In the one, 
property rights are given legal protection but with weak separation 
of powers and the former accordingly may be changed quite easily.  
In the other, political power is widely and effectively dispersed but 
property rights not well protected: In this case the insecure property 
rights are, so to speak, “locked in”, because predatory veto players 
will be able to block changes that would have made property rights 
more secure.  It seems plausible to suggest that these latter 
environments will be less conducive to economic growth than the 
first mentioned scenario, but at least marginally more so than the 
second scenario (Justesen 2014).  In other words, we get a relation 
that looks as follows with respect to whether property rights are 
secure or insecure and the separation of powers strong or weak:  
 
Strong & secure > (strong & insecure; weak & secure) > weak & insecure. 
 
That is, we would expect economic growth to be more rapid when a 
nation’s politico-economic environment is characterized by both 
secure property and institutionalized power sharing, and lowest 
when neither of the two is present.  Viewed in this way, political 
institutions with veto players may therefore work as a conditioning 
variable that will moderate the links between property rights and 
economic growth. In reality then, it is the interaction between veto 
players and property rights that matters for economic growth, 
rather than either one in isolation  (Justesen 2014). 
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2.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL VETO PLAYERS VERSUS PARTISAN VETO 
PLAYERS 
We have written above of veto players in the abstract, but in practice 
they may come in different forms (Tsebelis 1995).  Two types of veto 
players can be identified: institutional veto players, explicitly defined 
by a formal constitutional arrangement, e.g., a president and one or 
more legislative chambers whose assent is necessary for laws to be 
enacted and signed into law, courts with the power of judicial 
review, binding referendums and so on, all comprising a formal 
system of checks and balances. Alternatively, they may be partisan 
veto players, i.e., political actors elected to a parliament under the 
banners of majority and minority political parties or grouped 
together in coalitions in a multiparty government. In either case, one 
party or party coalition may be able to block action by the other.  An 
example is the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in United 
Kingdom formed in 2010. 
There are good reasons to believe that the empirical effects of one 
type of veto player may be quite different from the other, depending 
on the context, e.g., government stability (Tsebelis 1995, 2002) or 
fiscal policy stance (Dahl 2014).  It is plausible that the extent to 
which veto players are either institutional or partisan also may 
influence their effect on property rights protection, and there are at 
least two reasons for this. 
First of all, institutional veto players (e.g., in the form of a 
bicameral legislature) are in a sense more central to collective 
decision-making than partisan veto players.  In the former case, 
agreement between the veto players is necessary to effect a change; 
in the latter, agreement between them is, strictly speaking, neither 
necessary nor sufficient (Tsebelis 1995: 302f).  Second, one may 
expect that veto players who are institutional in nature are more 
“credible” than partisan veto players, because their configurations 
are relatively harder to change deliberately and more unlikely to 
change rapidly and repeatedly.  Parties’ strengths go up and down 
from election to election and may occasionally be crucially 
dependent on solitary individuals; fundamental political institutions 
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(typically set out in a constitution) change more slowly and 
disappear only rarely.6  Together these considerations suggest that 
an increase in the number of institutional veto players is more likely 
to have effects similar to those usually associated with a separation 
of powers than is an increase in the number of partisan veto players. 
 
2.4. The importance of “democratic capital”  
 
While the previous points suggest that the economic effects of 
property rights vary according to the political power-sharing 
arrangements in place, but these effects in and of themselves may 
materialize only under certain conditions.  Recent contributions to 
the literature on democracy and economic growth have particularly 
highlighted systematic performance differences between countries 
with low and high stocks of “democratic capital”, i.e., historical 
experiences with democracy.7  Specifically, countries with low 
stocks of democratic capital (often young democracies) tend to 
perform worse on a range of economic, institutional, and political 
indicators than countries with larger stocks of democratic capital 
(often older, more consolidated democracies).8   
In this perspective, differences between countries’ stocks of 
democratic capital may also affect the way property rights and 
power sharing institutions operate, and the extent to which 
investors and voters are confident that these institutions are durable.  
Kapstein and Converse (2008: 32-33) argue that young democracies 
differ from older democracies in two key respects.  First, transitions 
into democracy are likely to be followed by periods of uncertainty, 
                                           
6 See also Krehbiel (1996), who demonstrates that there are reasons to believe 
that the mere presence of institutional veto players, irrespective of their partisan 
leanings, will be able to provide “gridlock”. 
7 See Gerring et al. (2005);  Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro (2012); Keefer (2007); 
Kapstein and Converse (2008); and Persson and Tabellini (2009). 
8 See  Keefer (2007); Gerring et al. (2005); Gerring, Thacker and Alfaro (2012); 
and Persson and Tabellini (2009). 
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where powerful actors may renege on their prior commitments to 
support the institutions of democracy, and where the new rules of 
the game are weakly institutionalized (Gerring et al. 2005: 332-333).  
As emphasized by Gerring et al. (2012: 3), this means that, “in a new 
democracy there is little assurance that the democratic framework 
will hold”.  That conjecture is supported by empirical evidence 
suggesting that the likelihood of democratic reversals declines with 
rising stocks of democratic capital (Kapstein and Converse 2008: 40-
41; Persson and Tabellini 2009), implying that the democratic regime 
within which investors and businesses operate becomes more stable.  
In comparison, the uncertainty created by the potential for regime 
reversals in young democracies may adversely affect investors’ 
confidence in economic institutions, such as property rights that 
protect their investments and division of political powers that “lock 
in” property rights over time.  By implication, the joint growth effect 
of property rights and veto players may be offset in young 
democracies precisely because of the risk of regime reversals.  
Secondly, as Keefer (2007) argues, politicians in young 
democracies are often unable to make credible commitments to 
deliver broad-based policies, and voters therefore generally do not 
trust the election promises of politicians. As a result, politicians 
often switch to electoral strategies relying on clientelistic networks, 
which may result in under-provision of public goods and over-
supply of private goods, the producers of which have captured rents 
through the political process (Keefer 2007).  
If the under-provision of public goods includes the rule of law 
and property rights protections, problems of credible commitment 
in the electoral arena may also weaken investment incentives for 
economic agents. Moreover, like voters, investors too may have little 
confidence in the policy promises of politicians in young 
democracies. This may partly be due to the risk of regime reversals, 
but it may also be caused by the fact that it takes time for parties and 
governments to build reputations for, e.g., delivering public goods, 
maintaining economic institutions, and honoring contracts (cf. 
Keefer 2007: 806). Economic agents may therefore be reluctant to 
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undertake investments and place business activities in young 
democracies, even if institutions like property rights and political 
power sharing are established formally. Because of comparatively 
high risks of regime reversals and the credibility problems facing 
governments in young democracies, we expect that institutions—in 
our case the interaction of property rights and veto players—will 
have weaker economic effects in countries with low stocks of 
democratic capital.  But as democracy becomes more consolidated 
and—at least in expectations—is considered to be “the only game in 
town” (Linz and Stepan 1996), the uncertainty associated with 
regime reversals in newly established democracies is reduced.  We 
therefore expect the joint growth effect of property rights and veto 
players to materialize chiefly in democracies with relatively large 
stocks of democratic capital. 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
 
On the basis of the previous discussion we can now approach the 
issue of how to translate theory into empirical research.  First of all, 
we would expect political systems with a strong interaction between 
property rights protection and the number of veto players to be 
associated with faster economic growth (section 2.3.1).  We also 
expect that the interaction effect will be stronger in political systems 
characterized by institutional veto players rather than partisan veto 
players (section 2.3.2).  Finally, we expect that the growth effects will 
be stronger in countries with higher rather than lower stocks of 
“democratic capital” (section 2.4). 
 
3.1 Research strategy and data 
 
To estimate the growth effect of the interaction of property rights 
and veto players, we run a series of fixed effects regressions, given 
by (1), for more than 100 developed and developing countries 
during the period 1970-2010. The panel is organized at five-year 
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intervals, where economic growth is measured as the first difference 
of the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, using data from the 
Penn World Table (PWT), version 7.1. 
 
  (1) 
As a proxy for property rights (PR), we use the Property Rights & 
Legal System component from the Fraser Institute’s Economic 
Freedom index (Gwartney et al. 2011); veto players (VP) are 
measured using Henisz’s index of Political Constraints (POLCONIII, 
Henisz [2002] 2010); and PRxVP is the multiplicative interaction 
term.  These measures of property rights and veto players are used 
widely in the literature (Henisz 2000; Li and Resnick 2003; Nyström 
2008; Justesen and Kurrild-Klitgaard 2007; Justesen 2008; Melton 
2013). All regressions contain country (αi) and period (λt) fixed 
effects. The country fixed effects capture the impact of all time-
invariant factors, such as geography and colonial history, while the 
period fixed effects account for global events that are common to all 
countries. 
To guard against spurious correlation, we also include a set of 
lagged time-varying control variables that may affect both economic 
growth and selection into particular institutional regimes. The 
control variables are fairly standard in the growth literature and 
include the measure of electoral contestation developed by 
Przeworski et al. (2000) and updated by Cheibub, Gandhi and 
Vreeland (2010); regime stability from the POLITY IV data;  battle 
deaths from the PRIO/Uppsala conflict data to account for the 
impact of violent conflict; population growth (PWT 7.1, Heston, 
Summers and Aten 2011); average years of schooling as a proxy for 
human capital (Barro and Lee 2010); trade volumes (PWT 7.1); and a 
measure of oil production from the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (2012) to control for “resource curse” effects (Sachs and 
Warner 2001; Ross 2012; Paldam 2013). We also include ln(real GDP 
per capita) to account for convergence effects (Barro 1996, 2012).   
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However, using the (first) lag of GDP per capita as a right-hand-
side variable in growth regressions means that equation (1) 
corresponds to estimating a dynamic model with a lagged 
dependent variable (Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort 1996; Barro 2012).  
In fixed effects regressions, this creates biased estimates because of 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error 
term—the so-called “Nickell bias”.  The size of the bias is inversely 
related to the time dimension (Nickell 1981; Barro 2012), which is 
quite small (T = 8) in our panel.  In addition to the standard fixed 
effects regressions, we therefore address the Nickell bias by 
estimating equation (1) using Arellano-Bond GMM regressions 
(Arellano and Bond 1991; Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort 1996; 
Acemoglu et al. 2008). Detailed variable descriptions and summary 




3.2.1 INTERACTION EFFECTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND VETO 
PLAYERS 
Results for the growth regressions including the institutional 
interaction term are shown in Table 1, both for the full sample of 
countries (World) and for a subsample of less-developed countries 
(LDCs).9  All models contain a multiplicative interaction term, as 
well as it constituent terms (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006: 66-70). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The odd-numbered columns in Table 1 show results from fixed 
effects regressions using OLS estimation, while the even-numbered 
columns show corresponding results obtained using Arellano-Bond 
                                           
9 LDCs are defined as all countries outside West Europe, North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 
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GMM estimation. Models 1 and 2 show results for the full sample of 
countries and models 3 and 4 replicate these models for the LDC 
subsample. While the interaction term is positive in all models, the 
coefficients are larger in LDCs, suggesting that the interaction of 
property rights and veto players has bigger effects in this group of 
countries. It is well-know that the interaction effect is not revealed 
fully by the coefficients of the interaction terms (Brambor, Clark and 
Golder 2006). Figures 1a and 1b therefore show plots of the marginal 
effect of property rights at varying values of political constraints, 
with 90% confidence intervals given by the dotted lines.  
 
[Figures 1a and 1b about here] 
 
Figures 1a and 1b show how the effect of property rights varies as 
the values of political constraints change from weak to strong along 
the horizontal axis.  For both plots, it is clear that the interaction 
effect is positive and becomes significant at relatively modest values 
of the political constraints variable.  Substantially, this means that as 
governments face more political and institutional constraints, the 
average growth effect of property rights increases, all else equal.  
This implies that property rights matter more in political systems 
that divide power among multiple veto players. In contrast, the 
economic growth effect of property rights is small and insignificant 
in political systems where power is concentrated in the hands of 
only one veto player.  These results corroborate the findings of 
Justesen (2014), who reports similar results albeit only for 
developing countries and over a shorter time period (1970-2000).   
 
3.2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL AND PARTISAN 
VETO PLAYERS 
While Justesen (2014) uses the composite measure of political 
constraints as a proxy for veto players, models 5-12 expand upon 
this work by decomposing the POLCON index into two variables 
that serve as proxies for institutional and partisan veto players, 
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respectively.  First, we construct a simple measure of the number of 
legislative chambers (0, 1, or 2) in the political system, using data 
from Henisz’s political constraints dataset, and use this variable as a 
proxy for the number of institutional veto players.  Second, we use 
Henisz’s index of legislative fractionalization as a proxy for the 
number of partisan veto players in the lower chamber.  In this way, 
we are able to make a rough distinction between institutional and 
partisan veto players. 
In models 5-8, we interact property rights with the number of 
legislative chambers, and in models 9-12 we interact property rights 
with legislative fractionalization.  The coefficients of the interaction 
of property rights and legislative chambers are consistently positive, 
while the interaction of property rights and legislative 
fractionalization appears to be weaker and closer to zero.   
 
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the interaction effects and their statistical 
significance.  Figure 2a shows the marginal effect of property rights 
and how it changes as the number of legislative chambers increases, 
all else equal.  Interestingly, the effect of property rights strengthens 
as the number of legislative chambers increases, but becomes 
significant only above values of one (1) on the measure of legislative 
chambers. That is, property rights start to have positive and 
significant effects on economic growth when some division of 
power between the executive and legislative veto players is 
introduced. 
Figure 2b shows that the relationship is somewhat different when 
it comes to partisan veto players. Firstly, while the marginal effect of 
property rights increases slightly as legislative fractionalization 
increases, it is quite weak. Secondly, the growth effect of property 
rights is just barely significant at medium values of legislative 
fractionalization, and disappears if we include data for all 
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countries.10  This might suggest some positive conditioning effects of 
moderate degrees of power sharing among partisan veto players 
(Cox and McCubbins 2001).  However, since this result is quite 
weak, we hesitate to conclude that legislative fractionalization has a 
particularly robust conditioning effect on the relationship between 
property rights and economic growth.  Rather, the results suggest 
that particularly institutional veto players—measured as legislative 
“checks” on the executive—increase the growth-promoting effects of 
property rights, while the conditioning effects of partisan veto 
players are weaker.  To the best of our knowledge, these are new 
results that have not previously been reported in the literature. 
Our interpretation of the differing conditioning effects of 
institutional and partisan veto players is that institutional veto 
players are likely to create an environment where status quo 
property rights are relatively more credible and stable.  Institutional 
veto players are often more durable and subject to change only in 
the longer run.  In contrast, partisan veto players and legislative 
fractionalization are directly affected by election outcomes, and 
therefore subject to changes in the shorter term, which may render 
existing property rights less credible.  Institutional veto players may 
therefore serve as a more enduring credibility mechanism than 
partisan veto players.  Of course, this means that institutional veto 
players contribute to increasing economic growth only when the 
property rights that exist in the status quo are strong (Justesen 2014).  
If status quo property rights are weak, institutional veto players 
may serve to block institutional reform to a greater extent than 
partisan veto players, and thereby contribute to weaken economic 
growth.11 
                                           
10 Additional plots are available upon request. 
11 The coefficients of the constituent terms on the veto players variables in Table 
1 show the effect of veto players when the value of the property rights variable 
is zero (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006), corresponding to a situation with 
weak property rights.  In such cases, the coefficients indicate that institutional 
veto players have negative effects on economic growth. 
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However, when status quo property rights are strong and coupled 
with political institutions that make them difficult to change, 
investors receive a credible signal that property rights are both 
strong now and can be relied upon in the future.  This is likely to 
create strong incentives for economic agent to undertake the 
investments required for generating economic growth.   
 
3.2.3 INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC 
CAPITAL 
While the results above suggest that the interaction effect of 
property rights and veto players is quite strong, this section 
proceeds by testing the interaction effect in subsamples of countries 
with low and high stocks of “democratic capital”. As outlined in the 
theory section, we expect the growth effects of institutions—
including the interaction of property rights and veto players—to be 
weaker in countries with low levels of democratic capital than in 
countries with higher levels of democratic capital. In Table 2, we test 
these conjectures by dividing countries into two groups: One with 
low stocks of democratic capital, and one with higher stocks of 
democratic capital.  In order to separate small and large stock 
countries, we use the Przeworski et al. (2000) democracy indicator, 
updated by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). Using these data, 
we calculate the accumulated number of years a given country has 
been a democracy during the period we examine. In Table 2, 
countries that have a minimum of one (1) and a maximum of ten 
(10) years of experience with democracy are coded as having low 
stocks of democratic capital.  This means that we exclude from the 
analyses countries that have no experience with democracy, i.e., 
stable non-democracies.12 Countries with more than ten (10) years of 
                                           
12 Note that Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) 
both code Botswana as a non-democracy because the same political party has 
held office since democratic elections were introduced there. This coding is 
controversial, since Botswana it mostly regarded as long-standing democracy 
(Robinson and Parsons 2006). However, in our case, dropping it ensures that 
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democratic experience are coded as having large(r) stocks of 
democratic capital.13  To ensure that the results are not driven by 
consolidated democracies in the Western world, the sample consists 
only of less developed countries (LDCs) with at least one year of 
experience with democracy according to the data of Cheibub, 
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows results from regressions testing the growth effect of 
the interaction of property rights and veto players in countries with 
low and high(er) stocks of democratic capital, respectively. Model 1 
tests the interaction between property rights and the composite 
POLCON measure in countries with low stocks of democratic 
capital. Model 2 replicates this regression in countries with high 
stocks of democratic capital. Models 3 and 4 reproduce models 1 
and 2 using GMM regression. Consistent with our expectations—
and the broader views in the literature (Keefer 2007)—the results of 
models 1-4 show that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
roughly twice as large in countries with high stocks of democracy 
compared to low stock democracies.  
 
[Figures 3a and 3b about here] 
 
To illustrate, Figures 3a and 3b show the marginal effect of property 
rights at different values of veto players with corresponding 90% 
confidence levels, based on models 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 3a 
clearly shows that although the interaction of property rights and 
veto players is positive, it clearly is insignificant across all values of 
veto players. That is, in countries with low stocks of democratic 
capital—including young democracies—the joint growth effect of 
                                                                                                                           
the results are not driven by the presence of Botswana in the group of countries 
with high stocks of democratic capital.  
13 The results are similar if we chose, e.g., 15 or 20 years of democratic 
experience as the cut-off point.  
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property rights and veto players is weak and insignificant. In 
contrast, Figure 3b shows that in countries with high stocks of 
democratic capital, the interaction of property rights and veto 
players is positive and becomes more significant as the number of 
veto players increases. These results clearly suggest that while the 
growth effect of property rights increases as political power is 
divided among more veto players, this effect materializes chiefly 
when countries achieve more extensive experience with democracy 
and where democracy, by implication, is more institutionalized and 
less susceptible to reversal. 
 In models 5-8 we interact property rights with the index of 
legislative chambers. These results corroborate the finding that the 
interaction effect is weaker in low-stock democracies and matters 
mainly in high-stock democracies. Finally, models 9-12 include the 
interaction of property rights and legislative fractionalization. While 
the interaction is positive in high stock democracies, the variable’s 
explanatory power is not robust and becomes insignificant across all 
values of veto players in model 12.  (Plots of marginal effects are 
available upon request.) 
These results therefore suggest two patterns in the relationship 
between property rights, veto players, and economic growth: First, 
institutional veto players rather than partisan veto players drive the 
interaction effect. Second, the growth effect of the interaction of 
property rights and institutional veto players is found mainly in 
countries with large stocks of democratic capital. Overall, we find 
that the growth effect of property rights increases when institutional 
veto players make property rights institutions credible and hard to 
change, and that this effect applies primarily to political regimes 
that have relatively extensive experiences with democracy. In 
countries with low stocks of democratic capital—including young 
democracies—institutions have a much weaker effect on economic 
growth. These results are consistent with recent empirical 
contributions to the literature (Gerring et al. 2005; Gerring, Thacker 
and Alfaro 2012; Keefer 2007; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Persson 
and Tabellini 2009) in the sense that the economic effects of 
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institutions weaken in countries that are young democracies, have 
limited experience with democratic forms of government in their 




In the present study we have found support for the classic 
Madisonian view: That a government that is limited in what it (and 
the citizens) may do with respect to private property rights, 
reinforced by a separation of political powers, will be one that is 
hospitable to economic growth and accordingly to long term 
prosperity. 
This view is—as indicated—classic, but the present study adds 
substantially to the empirical research on the topic.  We have added 
further to the studies suggesting that well-protected property rights 
are important for economic growth, but also to the more novel 
insight that property rights protection alone may not be sufficient.  
As such, the analysis has contributed to the debate over whether 
constitutions are “guns” (that act with force) or merely “parchment” 
(that may be ignored) (cf. Wagner 1993; for empirical studies, see, 
e.g., Vanssay and Spindler 1994).  Specifically, we have provided 
three important insights: 
First, that “mere promise” of property rights protection is not 
enough to generate economic growth but may need to be embedded 
in a political system with separation of powers in order to be 
credible.  The actors in political systems wherein power rests in the 
hands of only one “player” may offer promises, but may also change 
their minds—and for that reason they will tend to grow more 
slowly.  These results are novel relative to prior studies that have 
not looked at the interaction (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2003; Justesen and 
Kurrild-Klitgaard 2007), include fewer, less “global” observations 
(Melton 2013; Justesen 2014) or focus on other dependent variables, 
such as capital investments or foreign exchange rates (e.g., 
Weymouth 2011; Marshall and Stone 2012) 
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Second, we find that not all veto players are equal: The positive 
growth effects of property rights given a separation of powers is in 
reality due to institutional veto players rather than simply more 
political parties.  It is legislative “checks” on the executive that 
increase the growth effects of property rights, while the 
conditioning effects of partisan veto players are weaker.  This is an 
altogether novel result. 
Third and finally, we find—which is novel but consistent with the 
literature on young democracies—that the growth effects of 
institutions weaken in countries with low stocks of “democratic 
capital”, i.e., countries that are young democracies and/or have 
limited experiences with democratic forms of government in their 
recent histories.  For these countries, the main challenge seems to be 
to consolidate the nascent regime and “hang on” to democratic 
institutions, even though the early stages of democracy may 
produce only weak economic results. 
All in all, our results substantiate the claim that constitutions are 
not simply “parchment” promises but have real effects, including 
for the living standards of the citizens. 
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Table 1. Institutions and economic growth: Interaction effects of property rights and veto players.  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Method FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM FE GMM 
Sample World World LDC LDC World World LDC LDC World World LDC LDC 
             
Property rightst-1 0.29 -1.67* 0.50 -1.65 -0.03 -2.02* 0.23 -2.29* 1.02 -0.30 1.34 0.40 
 (0.39) (1.79) (0.59) (1.57) (0.04) (1.92) (0.24) (1.95) (0.87) (0.18) (1.13) (0.26) 
POLCONt-1 -13.40 -36.48** -24.27 -46.14***         
 (1.11) (2.45) (1.65) (2.78)         
Leg. chamberst-1     -4.35 -14.67*** -6.26 -14.87***     
     (1.35) (2.97) (1.55) (2.68)     
Leg. fract.t-1         12.87 18.91 11.09 12.36 
         (1.17) (1.15) (0.97) (0.84) 
Prop*POLCONt-1 2.99 8.63*** 5.27* 10.64***         
 (1.48) (3.39) (1.93) (3.11)         
Prop*Chambers.t-1     1.06* 2.57*** 1.43* 3.01***     
     (1.78) (3.03) (1.83) (2.82)     
Prop*Leg. fract.t-1         0.05 1.86 0.69 1.81 
         (0.02) (0.69) (0.31) (0.66) 
Democracyt-1 2.32 0.79 2.46 0.11 2.04 4.97 2.55 2.47 0.21 -9.29** -0.32 -6.63 
 (0.83) (0.18) (0.78) (0.03) (0.72) (0.99) (0.85) (0.53) (0.09) (2.03) (0.13) (1.47) 
Stability t-1 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.15 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.87) (0.54) (0.55) (1.36) (0.72) (0.23) (0.49) (1.29) (0.46) (0.16) (0.08) (0.63) 
Battle deathst-1 -10.03*** -13.08*** -8.32** -12.34*** -10.09*** -12.72*** -8.46** -12.49*** -9.94** -13.86*** -7.97 -11.07*** 
 (2.93) (3.71) (2.13) (4.00) (2.95) (3.98) (2.18) (4.27) (2.12) (3.63) (1.45) (2.90) 
Log(GDP/cap)t-1 -26.16*** -43.16*** -23.54*** -35.40*** -26.13*** -41.90*** -23.36*** -33.38*** -24.24*** -39.39*** -20.98*** -33.37*** 
 (7.58) (6.00) (6.85) (5.24) (7.31) (6.22) (6.50) (5.13) (6.16) (5.21) (5.39) (4.57) 
Pop. growtht-1 14.46 45.01*** 16.80 43.89*** 14.52 37.60** 16.74 36.57** 12.09 34.15 9.13 32.00* 
 (0.80) (2.67) (1.05) (2.67) (0.80) (2.35) (1.05) (2.45) (0.61) (1.60) (0.54) (1.75) 
Schoolingt-1 -1.21 -2.04 -2.12 -2.27 -1.25 -2.65 -2.07 -1.85 -1.70* -1.89 -2.97* -2.33 
 (1.29) (1.12) (1.52) (0.99) (1.34) (1.58) (1.51) (0.83) (1.68) (0.87) (1.95) (0.84) 
Trade volumest-1 0.10*** 0.17** 0.08** 0.23** 0.10*** 0.18** 0.09** 0.25** 0.10*** 0.23** 0.08** 0.25** 
 (2.64) (2.27) (2.11) (2.57) (2.68) (2.03) (2.18) (2.38) (2.71) (2.56) (2.21) (2.35) 
Oil productiont-1 -25.61 -1.23 -56.46** -19.45 -24.73 -0.76 -55.82** -18.89 -32.70 -46.34 -85.44*** -68.27*** 
 (1.15) (0.04) (2.24) (0.88) (1.11) (0.03) (2.27) (0.99) (1.10) (1.34) (3.59) (3.31) 
______________             
Obs./countries 676/108 568/108 509/86 423/86 676/108 568/108 509/86 423/86 624/106 512/106 462/84 373/84 
R2 0.286 - 0.328 - 0.287 - 0.327 - 0.288 - 0.340 - 
Note. Dependent variable is growth in real GDP per capita (the first difference of ln(real GDP/cap.), multiplied by 100). FE denotes estimates from OLS regressions with 
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country fixed effects. GMM denotes estimates from Arellano-Bond GMM regressions. All models include period fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by 
country (absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2. Institutions and economic growth: Interactions in countries with low and high stocks of democratic capital 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Method FE FE GMM GMM FE FE GMM GMM FE FE GMM GMM 
Democratic 
capital stock 
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
             
Property rightst-1 0.06 -0.62 -0.51 -2.21 -0.44 -0.24 -1.95 -1.05 2.71 -2.75 1.96 -0.22 
 (0.03) (0.47) (0.30) (1.49) (0.23) (0.16) (1.02) (0.71) (0.50) (1.28) (0.57) (0.10) 
POLCONt-1 -11.88 -57.90** -22.24 -68.82*** - - - - - - - - 
 (0.56) (2.59) (1.04) (3.34)         
Leg. chamberst-1 - - - - -11.19 -14.83** -15.72* -16.78*** - - - - 
     (1.13) (2.60) (1.70) (3.09)     
Leg. fract.t-1 - - - - - - - - 28.11 -28.79 60.10* -2.90 
         (0.58) (1.31) (1.69) (0.15) 
Prop*POLCONt-1 4.60 10.67** 6.17 12.57*** - - - - - - - - 
 (0.90) (2.45) (1.39) (2.87)         
Prop*Chamberst-
1 
- - - - 2.77 2.78** 4.01** 2.96*** - - - - 
     (1.12) (2.64) (2.11) (2.74)     
Prop*Leg. fractt-1 - - - - - - - - -2.16 9.57* -5.36 3.56 
         (0.27) (1.92) (0.98) (0.87) 
Stability t-1 -0.90* -0.15 -0.19 -0.10 -0.89* -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 -0.83 0.01 -0.11 0.28 
 (1.90) (0.61) (0.91) (0.30) (1.98) (0.55) (0.73) (0.04) (1.39) (0.05) (0.55) (0.92) 
Battle deathst-1 -7.12 22.86 -13.75*** 29.67** -7.27 18.91 -13.69*** 19.07* -6.47 11.68 -18.66*** 23.98** 
 (1.39) (1.10) (3.98) (2.01) (1.64) (1.10) (3.42) (1.76) (0.97) (0.70) (5.67) (2.16) 
ln(GDP/cap)t-1 -40.16*** -34.55*** -39.30*** -53.19*** -40.64*** -32.83*** -39.30*** -54.35*** -35.60*** -27.95*** -25.08*** -59.41*** 
 (6.06) (5.25) (4.45) (8.69) (6.35) (4.57) (4.70) (7.09) (3.45) (4.97) (2.84) (6.81) 
Pop. growtht-1 118.53** -36.09 57.82 15.30 112.13** -43.48 51.50 24.12 118.37 -71.48 -0.53 -5.15 
 (2.54) (0.37) (1.30) (0.27) (2.36) (0.45) (1.31) (0.39) (1.40) (0.74) (0.01) (0.08) 
Schoolingt-1 8.80 -4.49 10.71** -3.55 9.60 -5.65* 12.52** -5.97* 5.72 -5.37** 8.75*** -3.30 
 (1.24) (-1.56) (2.24) (-1.17) (1.45) (-1.95) (2.55) (-1.74) (0.75) (-2.33) (2.63) (-0.97) 
Trade volumest-1 -0.00 0.10 -0.03 0.17* 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.23** 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12 
 (0.03) (1.20) (0.28) (1.65) (0.04) (1.27) (0.25) (2.25) (0.71) (1.21) (1.06) (1.12) 
Oil productiont-1 -1746.9*** 46.05 -1343.8*** 80.14 -1769.8*** 47.09 -1387.9*** 97.34* -1170.4*** 39.40 -1001.7*** 108.2** 
 (8.89) (0.75) (7.04) (1.32) (8.62) (0.82) (7.00) (1.88) (5.28) (0.69) (4.81) (1.98) 
______________             
Obs./countries 95/40 195/49 76/37 176/49 95/40 195/49 76/37 176/49 87/40 184/49 64/36 162/49 
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R2 0.69 0.52 - - 0.69 0.52 - - 0.66 0.49 - - 
Note. Dependent variable is growth in real GDP per capita (the first difference of ln(real GDP/cap.), multiplied by 100). The sample consists of developing countries (LDCs) 
with at least one year of experience with democracy during the period under investigation. Stable non-democracies do not enter the regressions. “Low” denotes countries with 
low stocks of democratic capital. “High” denotes countries with high(er) stocks of democratic capital. See text for details. FE denotes estimates from OLS regressions with 
country fixed effects. GMM denotes estimates from Arellano-Bond GMM regressions. All models include period fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by 




















Appendix: Variable descriptions and summary statistics 




Min Max N Obs. 
Real economic growth over five-year intervals (1970-
1975 etc.). First difference of ln(real GDP per capita), 
multiplied by 100.  
Penn World Tables, mark 7.1 
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2011). 
10.04 18.52 16.64 -115.66 202 187 1,713 
Property rights (see text for details). Area 2 from Fraser Institute 
(Gwartney et al. 2011). Economic 
Freedom of the World. 
www.fraserinstitute.org  
5.71 2.17 0.98 1.19 9.89 123 780 
Political constraints, POLCON (see text for details). POLCONIII (2000). Data from 
updated 2010 edition (Henisz [2002] 
2010). 
0.19 0.21 0.12 0 0.72 190 1,598 
Interaction: Property rights × POLCON As above. 1.75 1.65 0.76 0 6.62 123 780 
Legislative chambers POLCONIII (2000). Data from 
updated 2010 edition (Henisz [2002] 
2010). 
0.77 0.68 0.39 0 2 190 1,626 
Interaction: Property rights × legislative chambers As above. 6.05 5.25 2.28 0 19.74 123 776 
Legislative fractionalization in first chamber (see text 
for details). 
POLCONIII (2000). Data from 
updated 2010 edition (Henisz [2002] 
2010). 
0.42 0.29 0.17 0 1 181 1,293 
Interaction: Property rights × legislative 
fractionalization 
As above. 3.12 2.16 0.97 0 8.27 118 696 
Democracy. Electoral contestation dummy. 
1=Democracy; 0=non-democracy 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
2010. 
0.43 0.48 0.25 0 1 188 1,596 
Regime stability. Number of years regime has been 
democracy or autocracy. 
Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck et al. 2001; cf. Keefer 2007). 
20.88 27.79 12.61 0 196 161 1,513 
Battle deaths. Number of battle deaths in conflicts 
causing more than 25 battle deaths annually. 
Divided by population size. 
PRIO/Uppsala Conflict data. 
http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-
Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ 
0.05 0.64 0.60 0 23.67 185 1,838 
Ln(GDP per capita). Natural log of real gross 
domestic product per capita. 
Penn World Tables, mark 7.1 
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2011). 
8.25 1.27 0.40 5.08 11.38 187 1,713 
Population growth. First difference of (log) domestic 
population size 
Penn World Tables, mark 7.1 
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2011). 
0.10 0.07 0.05 -0.25 0.74 187 2,057 
Average years of schooling. Barro-Lee educational attainment 
data (Barro and Lee 2010), 2012 
update.  
5.27 3.05 1.69 0.01 12.91 145 1,740 
Trade volumes: Exports + imports as percentage of 
GDP.  
Penn World Tables, mark 7.1 
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2011). 
74.05 49.17 22.35 2.01 430.56 187  1,717 
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Oil production per capita. Daily oil production (in 
barrels) per capita. 
BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (2009). 
0.05 0.28 0.15 0 4.98 187 1,683 
Further statistical details are available from the authors. 
 
